It is a widely accepted notion that the major change brought by the 2003 November revolution in Georgia was the reform of the public services. Two major tasks were to be achieved for the state institutions: to monopolize the use of legitimate power on the state territory and to start providing services to the citizens. Police reform was at the heart of both these objectives. The major obstacle identifi ed on the way of this reform was corruption. Indeed it was widely known that posts in police forces were to be purchased; policemen were involved in organized crime, extortion, and other illegal pursuits. But the corruption itself was the effect of the broader system in which patrimonial system of not distinguishing between the public offi ce and private sphere was hybridized with the legal-rational rule, having its origin in the Soviet Union. The main subject of our research is to analyze the model of informal power network in Georgian police, to describe its confi gurations and identify its social actors. For the theoretical approach in our study we will use different theories describing informal institutes and the reasons of their existence. One of the main theoretical sources for our analysis will be the theoretical concept of Helmke and Levitsky. Helmke and Levitsky are describing four types of informal institutions which we plan to apply to Georgian police system and identify which of them is more relevant for Georgian reality. Also we will refer to such theories as: Mark Granoveter's strength of week ties and social "embeddedness" of economic action; Mars and Altman's Cultural Basis of Soviet Georgia; Ledeneva's theory of "Blat", which is one of most popular analytical theory about informal relations in post-Soviet countries. The main methods we have used are in-depth and narrative interviews. The interviews have been conducted with policemen currently working in different police departments, policemen no more working in this structure, expert and NGO representatives.
and "country of young/beginner democracy" are also used to describe the situation. In a transitional society, the weakening of various systems brings about the necessity to transform and institutionalise social institutions and practices. This process is reflected in all spheres of social life. One of the main parts of the transforming space is state/public institutions, which determine working and living conditions and the ability of the majority of the population to adapt to new conditions.
After the 2003 Rose Revolution reformation of many state institutions started in Georgia. The reform of public institutions is one of the most important for insuring efficiency of the state. All social groups are interested in making public services more affective, active and transparent. Despite the ongoing changes, public service institutions still retain, in their form and essence, qualities of autocratic management characteristic of "Soviet" institutions. This is extremely damaging -especially in the present situation, when state institutions are being formed -and it is necessary to create modern structures, use non-traditional methods of management, and take appropriate decisions.
The need for comprehensive reform of the Georgian Police has been recognized by the government, civil society, international donors and the police itself. Police reform has been seen as an opportunity to change the whole culture of policing in Georgia and has been developed in conformity with the principles of democratic policing: emphasis on respect for citizen's rights and freedom; service to and protection of communities; and to operate in the public's interest rather than that of the government and/or a ruling elite.
In the former Soviet Union (FSU), poor police performance can be explained by a combination of weak state capacity and poor state quality. Where the state has been weak, the influence of organised crime groups and police corruption has increased. By corruption we mean both predatory policing and police collaboration with organised criminal groups. Predatory policing is when police activities are devoted mainly to the material enrichment of the police themselves and political elites, rather than the protection of the public or elites. The newly independent states also inherited a poor quality policing model characterised by the politicisation of the police, human rights abuses, high levels of police corruption, and the predominance of patrimonial governance norms. The latter is a system of governance where access to state services and offices is not made according to "needs" or "what you know" but "who you know". After the Soviet Union collapsed, many of these characteristics were retained but access to police services (e.g. procuring a passport, ensuring a favourable outcome of criminal cases) and recruitment and promotion became increasingly marketised and corrupted (Kakachia, O'Shea 2012) .
The experts and researchers of post-communist countries agree that before the Rose Revolution, Georgia was a "failed state" with rampant corruption, collusion between criminals and politicians, and ineffective state institutions.
R E T R A C T E D
Under Eduard Shevardnadze's government, the entire state apparatus was organized along the lines of a pyramid of corruption. Public offices and police were sold from the top to the bottom, and officials expected returns on their investments. Money was made from embezzlement, kickbacks, the sale of public goods, collusion with organized crime, extortion and many other more or less sophisticated forms of converting administrative powers into private economic capital. In this environment, the state had virtually abandoned its public functions and stopped delivering basic services as the entire machinery of government had turned into a private market for corrupt informal transactions. Massive corruption and the dysfunctional state were major causes of the Rose Revolution in 2003 (Engvall 2012). Bringing order to such a society, together with maintaining a degree of legitimacy, was a difficult task. In this respect Saakashvili inherited Georgia in a same shape as Russia was in the aftermath of chaotic years of Yeltsin rule. The development of new and effective state requires first of all the strong policy of fighting against corruption and Organized Crime (Kupatadze 2012). The Georgian approach has been centered on state building, modernization and market liberalization, with a strong focus on improving the legislative basis of the state and reorganize public bodies. Within the security sector, reform of the agencies and institutions charged with public security management have been launched in tandem with those more usually associated with defence and security (including structural reforms and staff reshuffling initiated within the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), General Prosecutor's office, and also the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of State Security). A new tax code has also been presented to parliament to underpin the state's efforts to prevent corruption.
A need has emerged for organisational structure modification of public institutions and reconsidering HR policy at the first stage of reform. "A new revolution against bureaucracy has to happen in Georgia. The people have affected the Rose Revolution, and if up to now bureaucracy has been making laws for these people, now people will make laws for the bureaucracy" said President Mikheil Saakashvili (Khorbaladze 2005) .
Dismissing officials of the former government and "bringing fresh blood" to state institutions has been the approach of the new government.
The secretary of the National Security Council and one of the Rose Revolution leaders Giga Bokeria stated that for a long time corruption has been the established "rule of the game" in Georgian public service, quite suddenly the state policy have changed to the aggressive fight against corruption. This caused fear in the major part of the bureaucracy and according to Bokeria in some sense it should be so, however this caused the other, negative effectthe bureaucracy has problems with competence and experiences difficulties in making decisions. This significantly hinders establishing the major function of the bureaucracy -to serve the citizens: "Certainly the painful steps have R E T R A C T E D been made to reduce the number of bureaucracy, but it was necessary and it was the proper course. The state...had permission to rob our citizens. We will not tolerate such attitude any more. The bureaucracy must be properly funded, controlled and accountable. It could not be achieved without the steps we had made. Not only Georgia, no other normal country has such extended bureaucracy" (Bokeria 2005) . The Interior Ministry faces problems of the lack of an educated and professional cadre. It has taken some drastic steps to shake up some of the most stagnant and corrupt institutions, such as the former Transport and Traffic Police units (Boda, Kakachia 2005) . Giga Bokeria argues: "The first thing was to clean the Augean stables and create a government that could do elementary things and deliver basic services". As even that remark indicates, however, this is still the beginning, not the end, of a process. According to Thomas De Waal the central government that came to power after the Rose Revolution have achieved real results. They have very successfully eliminated everyday corruption and criminality. They have attracted foreign investment. Georgia now has efficient state services, something that cannot be said of most of its neighbours. You can buy an apartment or obtain a driver's license quickly and without paying a bribeno mean achievement given the country's traditions and those of its region (De Waal 2011) . Corrupt police officers, customs and excise officials who worked into their own pockets and with their own networks were dismissed in their thousands. Thus, the central government in Georgia did not only achieve a strengthening of their own position but also a modernization effect. The civil service was rendered more efficient and even though political corruption within the elite still belongs to the ruling practice petty corruption was fought successfully. The financial scope of the central government has increased considerably with the reforms of the tax authorities and the tax system (Matthais, Jobelius 2011).This simultaneous accord of modernization and the attainment of power is described by Stefes in his comparative study on authoritarian ruling methods in Caucasus very vividly. Stefes underlines following achievements in fighting corruption in Georgia: in large-scale raids, several former government officials and industrialists were arrested and were charged with corruption; local rulers and their governments were removed from office by Saakashvili; the police force was replaced more or less completely, whereby the new police officers were better paid and equipped; well-known markets for smuggled goods and smuggling routes were shut down by the government; better laws and less corrupt tax authorities put a stop to tax evasion. Stefes argues: "Within a few years, the state budget multiplied in this way. Of this money, a significant proportion was channelled into modernizing the police and security apparatus (…). Overall, the modernization of the state apparatus enabled a concentration of power in the hands of the central government. Using his party, the president was able to build and develop patrimonial networks". (Stefes 2010)
In 2011 there are worrying signs about the direction Georgia is heading. The modern Georgian project has many internal contradictions to it and is much less free than it looks. Some of the modern Georgian reforms have cured one problem while creating another. Reform of the police force and a broadly successful fight against crime and corruption, for example, have resulted in a criminal justice system in which acquittals in criminal cases are almost impossible, the prisons are overcrowded, and the Interior Ministry is the most powerful arm of government. Law enforcement bodies, such as the tax police, possess great power and are perceived as an instrument of political control. This raises Juvenal's famous old question: "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" ("Who is guarding the guards themselves?").
The results qualitative research carried out in 2011 (Engvall 2012) showed that in sum, while the high level of political monopoly in the first few years enabled the government to push through crucial reforms very quickly, the very same concentration of political power in the hands of a narrow group of politicians are increasingly turning into a cause for concern. The major challenge for the Georgian government is the perception of lingering partiality and favoritism at the highest political level. Several of the aspects rose as sources for concern by international and domestic NGOs, including central political interference, political unaccountability, judicial dependency and the use of other state bodies, like the tax service or recently the Chamber of Control, against oppositionists indicate that there is still work to be done. Still, the arbitrary use of power reflects a situation common in all countries that straddle the boundaries between authoritarian and democratic rule (Engvall 2012). According to Transparency International Georgia (TI Georgia) 1 a number of surveys reflect the notable improvements that have occurred in Georgia in recent years in terms of corruption. At the same time, suspicions of highlevel corruption are still being voiced and are sometimes borne out by factual evidence. In the 2010 edition of the Corruption Perceptions Index, Georgia ranked 68th (out of 178 countries surveyed), with a score of 3.8 out of ten. The country performed better than all of its neighbours (except Turkey) and all of the former Soviet republics (except for the three Baltic States). Georgia ranked the fourth cleanest country in terms of corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (behind Turkey, Croatia and the FYR Macedonia). The findings of the Global Corruption Barometer support the widespread belief that petty corruption, including bribery, has been virtually eliminated in Georgia. In the Global Integrity Index study which assesses the strength of anti-corruption mechanisms in different countries, Georgia's rating has fluctuated in recent years from "moderate" in 2006, to "weak" in 2007, to "very weak" in 2008, to "moderate" again in 2009 . Also, in 2009, Georgia was dropped from Global Integrity's Grand Corruption Watch List, while government accountability, the budget process, business regulation and law enforcement were listed among the key areas of concern. While virtually no one challenges the idea
that the government has largely succeeded in eradicating petty corruption, it is sometimes argued that corruption has changed shape in Georgia in recent years. For example, it has been suggested that, while the country suffered from rampant and all-encompassing corruption until 2003, presently, a "clientelistic system" has emerged where the country's leadership "allocates resources in order to generate the loyalty and support it needs to stay in power". It has also been suggested that there are significant opportunities for "cronyism and insider deals" because of the "concentration of power among a small and interwoven circle of individuals". The fact that Georgian society is generally characterised by a low level of confidence in public institutions and instead dominated by more traditional, informal relations could be a contributing factor here (together with the general weakness of the government's internal system of checks and balances and of external watchdogs).
There is substantial evidence to suggest reform has reduced police corruption and increased public trust in the police in Georgia. World Bank data indicate less interference by public officials (such as police) in business in Georgia, although they also highlight that corruption remains a problem in certain areas. In Georgia, the IRI's surveys indicate that, since the Rose Revolution, a large majority of Georgians have a favourable opinion of the performance of law enforcement agencies.
As it was rightly pointed out in the OECD Anti-Corruption Network's 2010 report, most of the existing studies on corruption in Georgia focus on perceptions, while little research has been done regarding the "levels, forms, types, manifestations and location of corrupt practices". The Georgian government is advised to sponsor research aiming to "qualify and quantify" corruption as it would provide reliable information to "inform, trigger and monitor policy change". To date, no such effort has been undertaken.
According to Transparency International Georgia's Global Corruption Barometer in 2012 in Georgia, nepotism in the public sector remains a concern (Transparency International, 2013) . The change of government that followed the 2012 parliamentary election has been accompanied by noteworthy new trends in public service and in discourse of informal relationships (nepotism). From 1st November 2012 to 1st March 2013, 4089 people were dismissed from public service. 2 Within the MoIA 897 employees were fired and 1012 new once recruited during the period of October 20, 2012 to February 19, 2013 (Transparency International, 2013 .
It is a widely accepted notion that the major change brought by the 2003 November revolution in Georgia was the reform of the public services. Two major tasks were to be achieved for the state institutions: to monopolize the use of legitimate power on the state territory and to start providing services to the citizens. Police reform was at the heart of both these objectives. The major obstacle identified on the way of this reform was corruption. Indeed it R E T R A C T E D was widely known that posts in police forces were to be purchased; policemen were involved in organized crime, extortion, and other illegal pursuits. But the corruption itself was the effect of the broader system in which patrimonial system of not distinguishing between the public office and private sphere was hybridized with the legal-rational rule, having its origin in the Soviet Union. The major goal of the present research project is to analyze the model of power network of the Georgian police, describe its configuration and identify stakeholders. A profound analysis of informal power networks and clientalistic practices requires an assessment of the institute and institutional transformations still going on within the institute. In other words, the project looks into external structural characteristics as well as identifies latent internal structures since the soviet times to present. Informal power networks, internal structure of informal practices and their character within the police system are strongly linked to those who exercise state authority.
The main objectives connected with the subject are: to identify the socialpolitical context of the informal power networks in Georgian police; to describe and analyse the recruitment of staff in Police System and the institutional tradition of informal practices in Georgia.
Methodological approach
According to the aims of the research, a theoretical study of the subject has been carried out. This included: theories defining the role of informal power in the process of democratisation, which have been studied with regard to the nature of the power and specifics of its functionality; research analysing the experience of countries where the principles function effectively; theories describing the risks of ignoring these principles and models of their distorted development. The experience of Eastern Europe and post-communist countries, which are in a similar position to Georgia, have also been studied.
In the process of the research main method we used was in-depth and narrative interviews. The pilot interviews that we carried out on the stage of project design have shown that if we interview only policemen currently working in different police departments we will not get full information about the subject. The information about latent functions and relationships in the police power network rather is possible to see in the interviews with policemen no more working in this structure, because this kind of respondents speak about problems in police system more open and without fear. Also important source of information are multiply convicted persons and convicted policemen, because they have experience of communication with policemen of different ranks and departments. In our sample we pay attention on ranks and statuses of respondents, we are interested in answers of respondents of all levels and ranks. Also we selected and compare policemen working in R E T R A C T E D different periods: Soviet period, post-Soviet -"Shevardnadze"-s period, period after rose revolution -"Saakashvili"-s period and current "Ivanishvili"-s period. Thus far, 42 interviews have been conducted -including, policemen currently working in different police departments, policemen no more working in this structure, expert, and NGO representatives. Georgia's Prime Minister Ivanishvili says the Georgian character is to be blamed in nepotism within the government. According to him, it is better if recruitment is based on the principle of competition, however, kinship and friendship ties are typical to Georgian character and there is "nothing terrible in it -let's not forget what being Georgian means. This is the way we are and do not think that the society can transform in 5 minutes. Two decades may not be enough and do not think that I will make a magic and bring those who will start typically new life. I do not think it is a disaster when someone knows someone else, is sure about his/her professionalism, experience and dignity. This is not a disaster or distortion. I think that it is better to select better [than him/her] through a competition." -said Ivanishvili. 4 The open and effective operation of police system may be ensured through merit-based career development practices based on clearly and formally predefined criteria. One of the pillars of police system management strategies is the establishment of a set of clearly defined criteria for measuring success. Survey results demonstrate that career development is based on "unwritten rules"; discussion of this issue is taboo and limited to very general and stereotypical answers. While discussing career development criteria, employees often refer to the issue of "showing off in front of a head person": "There is no practice of giving scores to employees based on their performance and documenting those scores for use in promotion. Career development depends on the relationship with and observation of a department head. There are no written rules. It is the task of a department head to observe the performance of employees: who is more competent, qualified etc. It depends on an evaluation and appraisal done by the head." (One of the respondents)
Informal power in
Meritocratic principles of management, as mentioned above, do not just involve the formalisation and general adoption of criteria for success; the main R E T R
A C T E D
indicator is the existence of a model for the identification and measurement of knowledge, experience and professionalism that is open and obvious for police system employees. The research revealed that the criteria for career progression and success conforming to meritocratic principles are not clearly formed in public service; discourse on it shows that police system reflection on this subject is superficial:
"There are no formal norms. I think they are mostly selected spontaneously, probably based on their qualifications, experience and on how much they show their expertise in the process of work. Promotion is decided on the strength of this. No documents are created stating that the employee can be evaluated in such-and-such a way; it does not happen this way, but as I said, on the basis of observation by and relationship with the manager. The manager can make observations: Who does a certain job better, who is more competent, etc." (One of the respondents) "Clearly defined criteria for career progression and success? I don't know, I certainly don't know. Of course there is career success in general! Based on how the person works, how they've demonstrated their abilities and how they are evaluated and valued by their manager." (One of the respondents)
Unlike common employees of the ministry, officials occupying higher positions better realize the importance of formalising the criteria and admit their absence in the police system at this stage: "There isn't a career development plan for each employee but just at the moment the HR department is working on this: Working out a career development plan consisting of very many criteria. It will mainly depend on evaluations, the quality of their work, their skills." (One of the respondents)
As the extracts from the interviews show, due to the lack of formalised criteria for career success, they are replaced by subjective manager evaluation, i.e., the commonly accepted selection criteria are very general and their identification is based on individual interpretation, allowing for a non-objective, informal approach. Consequently, according to the research results, work quality and efficiency evaluations carried out by public servants must become more standardised and formalised.
Non-formalised selection criteria are employed not only in the promotion process in police system, but also at the commencement of employment at the initial stage of one's career. In addition, police system organises employment competitions, yet our respondents failed to identify public servants employed at their department as a result of these competitions. The dominant discourse on this topic is as follows: "Not many people have been taken on in our department as a result of a competition. I don't know, I have no answer for this question... There
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haven't been big competitions during the last two years. I cannot tell you exactly how it was two years ago; I've been in this post for two years. For two years there haven't been big competitions so far, in my department.
There hasn't been a competition in our department since I've been here." (One of the respondents) "As a result of a competition in public service? In my case, since I've been here I haven't heard of an employment competition. You mean, a competition to employ people from the outside? There haven't been any external competitions as far as I know, since I've been working here." (One of the respondents)
The key assumption of the research at this stage was that one of the major characteristics of transformation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and the police system management strategy after the change of power (since 2012) has been the legalization of informal practices and introduction/ institutionalization of respective instruments. This assumption is based on a case study of new staff recruitment practices within the MIA and the police system.
Recruitment reforms have been undergoing in the MIA since October 2012. According to the MIA sources between 20 October 2012 and 19 February 2013 (inclusive) 1012 persons were recruited and 897 fired from the MIA, legal bodies under the ministry and other subordinated agencies.
Recruitment of staff in police system
After the change of the government in 2012, the law on the police took the effect. The law represents a drastically altered version of the original law adopted in 1993. These amendments not only created a latent space for informal practices, but also formed a ground for their institutionalization. The bill facilitates the return of an ugly tradition which represented one of the major sources of corruption from the Soviet times all the way up to the Rose Revolution. So called "raids', traditionally monopolized by the road police, will gain a new momentum as a result of the bill but under a modernized name of "specialized police control". "There is no need to meet the "grounded assumption" test stipulated by the procedural criminal code, nor an information on an individual having committed a crime, or an item being under the procession of an individual. Minister's order, coupled with bad luck -being in a wrong place at a wrong time, is enough to stop you and your car and ransack your items. The operation will be labeled as "checkup" and "revision". No verdict or court order will be required." (An expert) However, the bill, on top of the "raids" part, which has already created the feeling of returning to Shevardnadze's era for the residents of Tbilisi, is R E T R A C T E D also interesting in terms of a new reality which it creates by new rules of staff recruitment within the system. Many experts fear that the ratification of the bill is likely to be followed by a wide scale campaign of firing the police staff as few motives have been added to the rules regulating discharge of the police staff. New additions, such as "human resources-organizational measures" and "liquidation of structural sub-unit" are not stipulated by the laws on public service and the police. Besides, "competition and preparatory courses in the police academy will only be necessary for exceptional cases concerning specific positions, which means that recruitment will be based on personal-party-kinship relations". In parallel, upper age limit of 35 years will no longer be applicable for those who want to start working in the police system. There is no consensus among experts on the upper age limit -whether it be 35 or 40 years. However, what they agree on is that "the declared policies of the MIA are directing towards the return of chubby road policemen -so called "GAI". There had been exceptions to 35 year limit before, which means that, the proposed argument does not consider particularly talented applicants whose age will be the only impediment for starting career in the police." (An expert) The process has been dubbed as "wide scale personnel cleansing" by many experts as well as a number of NGOs. Based on the information provided by the respondents, reorganization affected almost all departments and units in Tbilisi, including the chief of Tbilisi police department. Besides, heads of almost all regional police departments have been replaced including the heads of Mtskheta-Tianeti, Samtskhe-Javakheti, Guria, Kakheti and Kaheti regional departments. The respondents say the changes are still ongoing.
It is worth noting that the respondents' opinions on the trends and politics of recruitment within the police diverse. There is a dichotomy of two opinions which dominate the discussion around these changes. According to the first opinion, current recruitment practices copy approaches employed by the previous government. Under a slogan "Ex government appointees are our enemies", the Saakashvili government dismissed the officials appointed by the Shevardnadze's government and transfused new blood to the government agencies. The proponents of the second opinion hold that the recruitment reforms have been neither spontaneous, nor have they considered firing staff by putting together a comprehensive list. The opinion according to which the new government is following the path of the Saakshvili's government in staff recruitment is backed up by the assumption that Ivanishvili's government not only cannot and should not afford trusting old staff, but also make every effort to clean up the ministry from those who misused their authority and often violated the law to remain loyal and faithful to Saakshvili.
And yet, what has been the purpose of side scale staff changes? Some interviews suggest that by implementing such changes the ministry managed
to meet the demand of the public who have been making constant reference to Merabishvili's staff. On the other hand, the high rank officials struggling for power, have been sent a clear message that the MIA minister is the one who hires, fires and makes decisions. The findings of the research at this stage suggest that there is a tendency to formalize and legalize the informal mechanisms of recruitment. What is a legal framework of recruiting staff within the MIA? The changes to some of the rules regulating certain aspects of staff recruitment in the police system taking effect Since 25 January 2013 made it possible to hire a head of the patrol squad or higher position, chief or deputy chief of the operations sub-department, detective-investigator, neighborhood detective-investigator, borderguard-controller and other high rank personnel without attending adequate professional, education or re-training program. The same practice applies to promotion policies. The order is valid up to 31 March 2013 and has limited duration. Though of temporary nature, the order still casts doubts and imposes risks in terms of transparency and impartiality of the recruitment process on the one hand, and relevant competences on the other. There is a possibility that personnel unable to meet adequate professional standards and requirements can still acquire positions within the police. There are legitimate questions to be answered including the one referring to underlying intention temporarily terminated educational courses and retraining programs. The official explanation provided by the MIA suggests that obligation to attend educational programs by candidates would further deepen a gap of addressing staff deficit induced by profound changes within the system. Obscurity and vagueness of transparent pre-conditions increase the risk of making biased decisions and nepotism, the respondents suggest.
What adds to the existing situation is that new staff has been recruiting by the ministry without considering the previous experience and proficiency tests while, further to the order by the minister, existing staff had to take exams to demonstrate the knowledge, qualification and level of professional skills. The decision resulted in questions and negative attitude towards the ongoing reform.
The biographies of deputy ministers demonstrate that most of them served as high rank officials within the MIA system at the Shevardnadze's government. Interesting parallels can be found while comparing the current recruitment criteria in the MIA with those employed by the Saakashvili's government. One of the major criteria of recruitment for high rank positions had been absence of employment records within the Shevardnadze's system. No preference would be given to the educated youth from the families of so called "intelligenca" while major emphasis was made on new faces. Incorruptibility was considered as one of the key criteria for the recruitment process. Social background, in other words, a candidate's income, living conditions (ownership of a house, real estate and liabilities, business etc) within a family, also served a determining On an earlier stage of transforming Shevardnadze's system, such an approach based on nepotism, did not stimulate privileges. Membership of the team and a contribution to the Rose Revolution had been more valid factors.
According to one of the MIA's high rank respondents, the staffs within state security, anti-corruption and counter-intelligence services have been selected from the Minister's team. Initially the minister tried to delegate staff recruitment to his highly trusted team members. Recruitment of the staff within regional departments by his deputies is an example of such practice. However, the minister was extremely unhappy with the choice made by his deputy and personally ordered to change newly recruited high ranks. He did not forgive one of his deputies, Aleko Tabatadze, patronage of those who were personally responsible for arresting Gharibashvili's father-in-law, General Tamatazashvili. As a result of failure, Kupatadze was dismissed from the position of a deputy minister.
Institutional tradition of informal practices in Georgia
Many scholars of informal economics argue that overarching corruptive bureaucratic systems, including the police, represent a Soviet legacy in post-Soviet, now independent countries. Yet other scholars contend that the roots of this phenomenon go to further past (archaic practices, monetary banknotes of power currency) (Golosenko 2003) .
In Georgia informal practices emerged in the Soviet economics and spread in a form of shadow economy. Georgian shadow economy boasted one the most robust shadow economy within the Soviet countries. The authors of a renowned article published in 1980s -late Soviet and pre-perestroika period, Mars and Altman argued that, the shadow economy flourishing in Georgia was a result of Georgian culture -"fundamental characteristics of the Georgian culture". These characteristics were originated by the value chain of the Georgian culture, such as rivalry (in particular, consumers habits), inclination to risks, arrogance and nepotism (Mars, Altman 1983) .
Soviet political system and respectively, a power circle of the system represented by millicia failed to regulate these illegal, informal and capitalistic
relations. The failure created a demand for an alternative instrument to resolve disputes in parallel to formal/legal law enforcement system. In fact, documents maintained in archives corroborate that as early as in 1980s, so called "thieves in law" acted in this very capacity (Slade 2010) . Eventually informal shadow practices started to embrace almost all spheres of social life (healthcare, education, justice, law enforcement etc). Therefore, informal practices are a part of Soviet legacy, but so strongly rooted in the consciousness that they are considered as routine, normal and sometimes socially acceptable phenomenon (Charkviani 2006) . According to some researchers, "Georgians… automatically refuse to accept a law in any form… We may say that the union of "thieves in law" generated the only incorrupt and effective system of justices throughout the country's history." (Nordin, Glonti 2006) . If this viewpoint is to be shared, it is inevitable that the institute of "thieves in law" will always exist in Georgia considering the inherent inclination in the Georgian culture. In Soviet Georgia alternative mechanisms come to motion and replacement takes place. Strengthening of one automatically entails weakening of the other. In a society whereby parallel legal systems are strong, development of legal consciousness is limited." (Charkviani 2005) .
As Gavin Slade argues, only "culturulogical" factor cannot be decisive. In other states of the Soviet Union, including Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the institute of "thieves in law' was also strong. Slade suggests the second factor -severe socio-political crisis following the war in Abkhazia in 1990s, is required for proper analysis of the issue. As a consequence of this crisis, Georgia suffered perhaps the most severe state collapse in entire Soviet Union which increased demand for alternative justice institutes caused not as much by ideological rigor (as of Soviet times), but a weak state (Slade 2008) .
In Georgia of 1990s' the power of "thieves in law" was challenged by the paramilitary group Mkhedrioni and corrupted police apparatus.
Based on the classification offered by a number of scholars, a political system can be "preying" (predator). Till 2004, the Georgian police system belonged to this very type. The police work was directed not towards protecting the public interest, but towards providing its own wellbeing. Protecting the interests of the ruling elite by constant coercion on various groups, was also part of the police job description (Theodore, Gerber, Sarah 2008) .
In 2006, Georgian criminologist Giorgi Ghlonti wrote: "Georgians automatically oppose any form of law. Georgians will politely implement directives by American and European reformers regarding justice, policing, taxation and then simply do nothing". In this sense, a series of reforms implemented in the country went beyond the political will and the sphere of social system and a stereotype of undefeatable corruption lying in the root of the Georgian culture, proved to be false (Nording, Ghlonti 2006) .
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Conclusion
The transition process of police in Georgia from old Soviet model towards that of modern police, based on international standards, is progressing and that takes a major effort. The experts and researchers of post-communist countries agree that before the Rose Revolution, Georgia was a "failed state" with rampant corruption, collusion between criminals and politicians, and ineffective state institutions, instead dominated by more traditional, informal relations. A number of surveys reflect the notable improvements that have occurred in Georgia in recent years in terms of police corruption and increasing public trust in the police. At the same time, suspicions of high-level corruption are still being voiced and are sometimes borne out by factual evidence.
Despite the structural and procedural reforms implemented in policing organizations across the country, the overall results are not very satisfactory. The open and effective operation of police system may be ensured through merit-based career development practices based on clearly and formally predefined criteria. One of the pillars of police system management strategies is the establishment of a set of clearly defined criteria for measuring success. The research revealed that the criteria for career progression and success conforming to meritocratic principles are not clearly formed in public service. Due to the lack of formalised criteria for career success, they are replaced by subjective manager evaluation, i.e., the commonly accepted selection criteria are very general and their identification is based on individual interpretation, allowing for a non-objective, informal approach. Non-formalised selection criteria are employed not only in the promotion process in police system, but also at the commencement of employment at the initial stage of one's career. Obscurity and vagueness of transparent pre-conditions increase the risk of making biased decisions and nepotism. The findings of the research suggest that there is a tendency to formalize and legalize the informal mechanisms of recruitment.
Overarching corruptive bureaucratic systems, including the police, represent a Soviet legacy in post-Soviet, now independent countries. Soviet political system and respectively, a power circle of the system represented by millicia failed to regulate these illegal, informal and capitalistic relations. The failure created a demand for an alternative instrument to resolve disputes in parallel to formal/legal law enforcement system. Eventually informal shadow practices started to embrace almost all spheres of social life (healthcare, education, justice, law enforcement etc). Therefore, informal practices are a part of Soviet legacy, but so strongly rooted in the consciousness that they are considered as routine, normal and sometimes socially acceptable phenomenon. The record of the past fifteen years indicates that the transformation from authoritarian to democratic policing is not something that can be achieved quickly, but is a long-term process requiring years of reform and investment. 
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